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DiMatteo: Modern Approach to Assignability

DEPERSONALIZATION OF PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS: THE
SEARCH FOR A MODERN APPROACH TO ASSIGNABILITY

by
LARRY A. DIMATrEO*
. INTRODUCTION

"It was once believed that a right could not be assigned. A 'right' was
conceived of as a sort of nebulous, ethereal, personalrelation."'
The ever-evolving nature of modem commercial transactions dictates the need to
review the common law area of personal service contracts. Namely, that when a court
labels acontractas one for"peronal service,"inconrasuto thegeneral rle of assignability,
it isperse nonassignable.2 A review of this exception to assignability is suggested when
one views the dramatic change in the nature of personal service contracts as well as their

increasing popularity.
Today, an ever-growing part of the American gross national product is in the service
industry. Thus, a critical review of the 20th centuy case law dealing with personal

services might suggest fundamental changes in the law. In general, there has been a
narrowing ofthe exception from the English common law days when the exception was
the rule.4 A review of the cases from the late 19th century to today will be undertaken
to see if this narrowing has provided a sound decisional matrix5 and to see whether the

exception can still be defended.
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, School of Business Administration, University of Miami; BA/BA State
University of New York at Buffalo, 1979, J.D. The Conell Law School, 1982. For his valuable comments I am
grateful to Professor Don Wiesner. The author would alsolike to thank Anthony D. Mariinezforhis valuable research
assitace.
Arthur L CobinAssigwnmnt ofContractRights, 74 U. PA. L REV. 207,213 (1926).
2 The per se nonassignable exception can be defined as follows: "When performance of personal services is
delegated, the trier merely determines that it is a personal services contract. If so, the duty is per se nondelegable.
There is no inquiry into whether the delegate is as skilled or worthy Cf trust and confidence as the original
obligor...." Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prod. Co., Inc., 801 F.2d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 1986). One may argue that
the assignee duld be undertken by the courts.
just such an inquiry into the qualities Cof
Approximately 40% of the Gross National Product in 1970 was made up of sales of services. STATISTCAL
ABSrRAcr OF ThE U.S., U.S. TREASUty DErr. 430, at table 676 (1992). In 1991 the percentage of the sales Cf
services of the GNP had incaased to 53%. Id.
4 See Grover C. Griamore,Effect ofARestriction inAssignmntrs a Contrac, 31 MICJ. L REv. 299,299 (1933).
The early conmon law took a srictly logical view in regard to the assignability of cnact rights
amd duties. Since a contract is essentially a personal relationship voluntarily entered into by the
parties to it, it follows as a logical deduction that one of the parties should not be allowed to destroy
that relationship by introducing a third person into it in his place without the consent of the other
party. This was the view f the early common law.
I&
5 See Boston Ice Company v. Potter, 123 Mass. 30(1877). See also Drewes v. FM Da-Sota Elevator Co. (In re DaSota Elevator Co.), 939 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1991); Northwestem Cooperage & Lumber Co. v. Byers, 95 N.W. 529
(Mich. 1903).
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However, the past 125 years has seen a sporadic pattern of expansions and contractions of the exception in different types of transactions. 6 This may be due to the change
in the size and nature of personal service transactions.7 The monetary stakes involved
in contemporary transactions are far removed from the old common law days where
most contracts formalized purely one to one relationships. In fact, it is often hard to find

the "personal" in personal service contracts when often time services have taken on the
standardized and interchangeable nature that characterizes transactions in goods. Thus,
this article will argue for the elimination of theperserule against assignability.8 Theper
se rle can no longer be defended in an age of increased fungibility in commercial
transactions, and the increased sophistication of the parties on the opposite sides of
today's bargaining tables.9

The courts' attempts to apply 19th century rationale to the increasing sophistication
of 20th century commercial transactions 0 have resulted in inconsistent decisions. A
comparison of the fact patterns among the cases has shown no consistent underlying

jurisprudence that a practicing lawyer can look to in preparing his arguments on
assignability. One can find many examples of conflicting decisions in cases involving
almost identical fact patterns, justified by the same personal service rationales. A

franchise maybe assignable"; butadistributioncontract involving a seemingly identical
factpattern is held to be nonassignable. 12 A contract to sell and buy hemp from a specific
- "The commercial spirit gradually made inroads into this docine...." See Grismore, supranote 4 at 299.
" A court has held that a football player may negotiate and promote his future services while still under a personal
service contract with a football team. World Football League v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club Inc. 513 S.W.2d 102
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974). "Bargaining for future services is a matter ofeconomics. The Club can assure itself of the
...
services and loyalty ofits players by offering them long-term cotracts...." Id.at 105 (emphasis added). In fact,
the complexity of today's transactions have evolved well beyond thenotion of the "personal" label used to rationalize
the nonassignability of personal services contracts. See infra notes 260-265 and accompanying text. One commentator has stated this evolution quite dramatically: -The complexity of most agreements insures that such agreements
sw=Provirionsofa Written
will rarely be fully completed." T. Egan. EquitableDoctrinesOperatingAgainstthe E
Contract (or When Black and Gray Equals Gray), 5 DEPAUL BUS. LJ.261,312 (1993).
s The difficulty will be to fashion more precise tests to allow assignment of certain personal service contracts. See
infra Section IV.
9 For example, today's personal service contracts involving entertainment and sports stars are negotiated through a
maze of specialized professionals: lawyers, agents, accountants, etc. The parties have no excuses for not protecting
themselves by negotiating express and detailed assignability clauses in their contracts.
10 See

supra note 9.

"Schupackv. McDonald's System, Inc., 264 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 1978) (holding the right offirst tfusal of McDonald
franchises not assignable without consent). ContraInre Sunrise Restaurants, Inc., 135 BR. 149 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1991) (olding BurgerKing franchise is assignable); In re Wlls MotorsInc., 133 B R 303 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding autcmobde frandise assignable by Chapter 11 debtor) Variscov. Oroweat Food Co. (Inre Vansco), 16 BR.
634 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (holding franchise for distribution and marketing Cf baked goods is assignable).
' Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communications, Inc.), 824 F.2d 725 (9th Cir.
1987) (marketing and development agreement); Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prods. Co., Inc., 801 F.2d 1001 (Tth Cir.
1986) (successor in hair care disuibution contract cannot take assignment without consent of distributor); O'Brien
v. Union Oil Co. of California, 699 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D.Ga. 1988); Berliner Foods Corp. v. Pillsbury Co., 633 F. Supp.
557 (D. Md. 1986) (food distribution contract); New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving &
Printing Co., 73 N.W. 48 (N.Y. 1905) (distribution of printing presses not assignable).
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field is held to be "personal" and nonassignable;13 while a contract to sell and buy grapes
from a specific field is held to be assignable."' Furthermore, cases have wavered as to
whether a change in the legal form of the obligor works an invalid assignment Is
For example, a simple change in the legal form' 6 of the obligor has resulted in some
courts finding that the change worked an illegal assignment' 7 This result was preordained once the court affixed the personal service label upon the contract. One questions

whether the law would better be served in such cases by the court undertaking a careful
analysis as to whether the change in form will be detrimental to the adverse party. The
detrimentality should be based on the expectations of the adverse party as to the totality
of the bargain at the time of contracting.
A review of the use of the "personal service" label in the case law will be performed
to see if certain factors can be enumerated to betterquantify its meaning. The review will
look to see if the application of the subjective determination of personal services is
infected with problems that plague the application of most subjective standards.'8 For
example, is the difficulty of determining the subjective intent of the parties replaced with
the courts use of their own subjective leanings as to what is "personal"? If so, can it be
argued that a better approach would be the use of a"totality of bargain" approach instead
of the subjective intent of the parties approach now in use? Are the expectations of the
parties sufficiently crystallized to be part of the bargain? If so, it will be argued that

"Shultz & Co. v. Johnson, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 497 (1845).
Unit v. Groezinger, 24 P. 42 (Cal. 1890) (holding contract to sell grapes to defendant from a specific field to be
assignable). In reference tothemuch dited case ofBostonlce Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28 (1877),the cou cmented:
"If it camot be so distinguished, we should be inclined to question the soundness of the decision." Larue v.
Groezinger, 24 P. at 43. See also Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1957) (license to sell
irrigation equipment is assignable), Cox v. Martin, 21 S. 611 (Miss. 1897) (cropping contract must be performed by
representative of deceased).
U Equifax Servslnc. v. Hitz, 905 P.2d 1355 (10th Cir.1990) (corporate merger) Hardy Implement Co. v. South Bend
Iron Works. 31 S.W. 599 (Mo. 1895) (withdrawal of a partncr); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d
311 (Mo. CL App. 1986) (change in partnerships); Nassau Hotel Co. v. Barnet& Bane Corp., 106 N.W. 1036 (N.Y.
1914) (individuals auemptng to assign contract totheirnewly formed orporation);NewYorkBankNote Co., 73 N.E.
48 (N.Y. 1905) (successor corporation).
"Examples ofdianges in legal forms: incorporation, merger, sale of corporation, changes in partners, etc. See cases
cited supra note 15.
1The word "assignment" for pmrposes of this article shall be defined to include both the assignment of rights and
delegationofduties. SeeREsATEMENT(SECND)OFCoNTRAcrS§ 328(1979);seealsoU.C.C. § 2-210(4X1977).
However, parties may "assign" only their "rights" and not their duties under a contract if specifically stated so in the
assignment The courts normally allow the "assignmnt"arighttooict money even inpersomal service contracts
when the corresponding duty has been fully performed or will be performed by the original party. Of course, the key
issue in the area of personal service contracts is the "assignment" of personal duties. See JOHN D. CALAMARI &
JOSEPHM. PR&uILO, CoNTRAcM 722 (3d ad. 1987) (noting that the words "assignment" and "delegate" ame words
of art and lawyers seen prone to use the word "assignment" in art fully).
IsIn contrast to the rationale behind the general rule of contract law, i.e., the objective standard of the "reasonable
pernu.
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assignability should be allowed if those expectations can be satisfied without the use of
the"personal service" mind-set cun-entlyused by the coults. Asimple testofassignability
would be whether the performance ofthe assignee meets the expectations ofthe obligee.
Alternatively, is the performance of the assignee equivalent to the performance which
would have been rendered by the assignor.1 9
Labelling and definitions aside, this article will examine the application of theper

se rule of nonassignab'lityl
by determining what public policy concerns are being
utilized by the courts to support their continued objection to assignability. Many courts
have avoided articulating specific rationales for prohibiting an assignment.2 Given its
vague definition, 2 courts have simply labelled a transaction as "personal" and once
labelled as such, rigidly apply the per se rule of nonassignability. It would seem that
whatever definition of'personal services that is used, if any, the labelling of a transaction
as "personal" should only be the first step in the inquiry regarding assignability. The
courts should carve out factors, express or implied, that can be used as reasons for not
allowing an assignment?
It will be determined whether the public policy matrix used under the general
principle of "freedom of contract ' can be used to support the corollary principle of free

The law of personal service contracts have always revolved around the rights of the adverse (obligee) party. This
should remain the primary focus. However, it would be remiss not to note that the rights of the obligor (the right to
assign) and the rights of an innocet thire party (assignee) are also involved and should be weighed in the decision
regarding assignability.
SPer se rule: "Certain kinds of contracts, oftan called 'personal service contracts,' are deemed by the common law
to be non-delegable.... Thomas H. Jason, Bankrptcy, Non-Bankrsqncy Entitlementsandthe Creditors'Bargain,
91YALEL. 857,896(1992). Theperserule ofnonassignability holds that once a contract is labelled as "personal"
then the contract rights and duties are per se nonassignable. However, over time the contract rights even in a
"personal" contract have been held to be assignable. Nonetheless, most courts have not allowed the assignment
(delegation) of duties once the "personal" label has been affixed to a contract. "Contract law generally distinguishes
the delegation of 'fungible' duties from the delegation of 'non-fungible' duties ... In essence, holders of thes
contracts are protected by a property rule: they do not have to deal with any assignees...." Id. See alsoDONALD
A. WIESNER & NICOLAS A. GLASKOWSKY, SCHAUM'S OUNE OF THEORY & PROBLEMS OF BUSINESS LAW
(1985). "[The rule against assignment of personal service contracts is generally upheld] provided they are indeed
based upon a personal relationship between the parties." Id. at 104.
"' This labelling of a contract as personal and not assignable was taken to an extreme in Johnson v. Vickers, 120 N.W.
837 (Wis. 1909). The court applied nonassignability retroactively to an executed contract. Id. at 839.
" Definition of "personal service" contracts: Contracts based upon the personal skills or other unique qualities of a
contracting party, such as, talent, trust, confidence, credit, knowledge and experience. It is "a contract... which so
far involves the element of personal knowledge or skill or personal confidence that it can be performed only by the
person with whom made." BLAC'S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (6th ed. 1990).
11The Bostont Ice case is an excmple of the dangers of a court implying terms of trust and confidence into a contract.
Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28 (1877). In that case the defendant took delivery and used conforming ice and
was allowed to avoid payment because of an earlier assignment of the contract. Id.
z' "[It is said that the paramount public policy is that freedom to conract is not to be interfered with lightly, and it
is the ocr's duty to sustain the legalityof a contract in whole or in part whenever it can do so." 17A AK JUR 2d
Contracts§ 264 (1991).
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assignability.' Current models already exist to protect or minimize the adverse party
from harm in the case ofan assignment. This article will review a numberof such models.
First, landlord-tenant laws' "consent may not be unreasonably withheld" principle.'
Second, the Bankruptcy Code's use of "assurance" to allow for the assignability of
shopping center leases?' Third, the assumption of secured indebteness. For example,
the sale of real estate where there is an assumption by the buyer of the existing mortgage.2 Fourth, the U.C.C. model of giving "assurance.'2
After a review of the case lawto this article will explore a number of different
approaches which may be utilized as an alternative to the per se nonassignability of
personal service contracts. 1 The approaches to be discussed as to this issue willillustrate
the type of factore2 a court may weigh in making a determination on assignability.3
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND PHILOSOPIUCAL BASIS FOR RULE OF
NONASSIGNABILITY OF PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS
The fundamental basis ofAmerican ontractlaw is thatparties shouldhave absolute

"freedom of contract" unless some overriding public policy concern restricts that freedom.' However, any such restrictiononthatfreedom isnottobetakenlightly and should
be strictly construed.1 Furthermore, rights under a contract are viewed as "property

" Free assignablity or alienability is subsumed within the principle of"freedom of contrac" For exanple: "The
law [today] generally favors free alienation... and... the right to assign...." Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So.2d 1171.
1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (involves assignment of a leasehold).
"Id. at 1172 n.2. Requirenent that a 'commercially reasonable" reason must be given: credit, tenant mix, diminishment in value. "An increasing number of jurisdictions hold that when a lease requires ...consent prior to
assignmentt... such consent may not be aditraily or ureasonably refused." Id. at 1173.
- 11 U.S.C. § 365 (b)(3X1988); See alsoln re FederatedDept. Stores, Inc., 126 B.R. 516 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
(upheld liberal assignability of shopping center leases under the Code).
" This assumes that thereis no "due-on-sale"provisions within the existing note and mortgage. Such mortgages have
become increasingly ram. However, there is one important exception, FHA (Federal Housing Administration) and
VA (Veterans Administration) guaranteed loans. Prior to 1989, these were freely assumable. Currently, they are
assumable subject to a favorable credit check cf the assuming party.
29See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
- See infra Sections H and IL
31See iafra Section IV.
' For example, the existence or lack of existence of an express nondelegation of duties clause would be one factor.
The issue then becomes whether such an express prohibition works its "magic" to prevent a delegation (assignment).
Are there sufficiently strong policy factors which override the pnohibition? For example, (1) The principle of free
assignability, (2) The marketability of the rights and duties.
" Strong public policy concerns for free assignability, such as the increased marketability and fungibility o personal
rights and duties, may suggest the need to recognize a presumption in favor of assignability. See infra Section V.
3
See supra notes 24-25.
- See 17AAL Ju. 2d Contracts § 264 (1991). See also Benev. New York Life Ins. Co. 87 S.W2d 979 (Ark. 1935);
Crimmins & Pierce Co. v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp., 185 N.E 383 (Mass. 1933); Tharp v. Allis-Oalmers
Mfg. Co., 81 P.2d 703 (N.M. 1938).
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rights" which one should be able to assign or sell. In fact, at one time, restraints on
assignment were considered an illegal"restraint on alienation." 3' However such restrictions against assignment have been upheld under the notion of freedom of contract
despite public policy concerns against restrictions on the free alienation of property

rights.37

Nonetheless, in a contract which does not restrict assignment, the rle of free alienation applies. Amajorexception to this free assignability has been in the area ofpersonal
services. It was firmly held that such contracts were not assignable because they were
delectuspersonage.38 Common law held that the duties under such contracts were so
personal that they could not be delegated. The obligee's expectations dictated that a
specific person would have to perform the duty.Y The court in the much cited Boston

Ice Company v. Potter/° in 1877, explained that "[a] party has a right to select and
determine with whom he will contract" and that "[i]t may be of importance to him who
performs the contract, as when he contracts with another to paint a picture, or write a
book."' The personal natr aspect of the nonassignability exception was more poeti42 "All painters do not paint portraits like Sir Joshua
cally stated in Taylor v. Palmer:

Reynolds, nor landscapes like Claude Lorraine, nor do all writers write dramas like
Shakespeare or fiction like Dickens. Rare genius and extraordinary skill are not trans-

ferable, and contracts for their employment are therefore personal, and cannot be as3
signed."4

3

6RoBmRT N. CORLEY & PETER J. SHEDD, FUNDAMENTALS OF BusINESS LAw 277-78 (5th ed. 1990).
3717AAM. JUiL 2d Contracts §303 (1980) (citing A~lhusen v. Caristo Constr.Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y 1952)).
3'Translates into "choice of the person." MARK E. ROs2KOWSKI, BUSINESS LAW PRINCIPLES, CASES, & POLICY
(1987). Such a concept can be traced back to Roman times: "In the language of Roman law, personal actions were
fotmdedupon an obligation...
."WS.
Holdsworth, The History ofthe Treamnt ofChose InAction by the Common
Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997,1002 (1920).
Jackson states the idea concisely as follows:
Contract law generally distinguishes the delegation of "fungible" duties from the delegation of
"non-fungible" duties. Certain kinds of contract, ofter called "personal service contracts," are
deemed by the common law to be nondelegable because they are based on particular skills oroter
unique featues of the contracting parties.... This prtects the expectations of a party that has
contracted with a particular entity in much the same say the specific performance tude does in other
circumstances.
Jackson, supranote 20, at 896.
'0 123 Mass. 28 (1877).
"Id. at 30.
"31 Cal. 240 (1866).
Id. at 247. See also Standard Chautaugua System v. Gift, 242 P. 145 (Kan. 1926) (contract to select and furnish
lecturs and entertainers was not assignable); Corson v. Lewis, 109 N.W. 735 (Neb. 1906) (contract for legal services
held to be personal); Deaton v. Lawson, 82 P. 879 (Wash. 1905) (contract involving professional services of a
physcian nonassignable).
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Thus, it has been held that such rights and duties should be excepted from the
fundamental principle of free alienation." In fact the courts have generally held that such
contracts wereperse nonassignable.5 The following review of the development of this
common law exception to assignability for personal service contracts will have two
focuses. First, to examine any problems which thisperserule may pose in application."
Second, to analyze the decisional matrix to determine any inconsistencies resulting from
the application of the per se rle to the subjective labelling of a contract as "personal."''
A. Lwnley v. Wagnerand Its Litany
The historical touchstone for the development of personal service nonassignability
is often traced to Lwnley v. Wagner.4 "The locus classicusor paradigmatic example of
personal service is the English precedent of Lumley v. Wagner. It involved a then
prominent opera singer.... The parties and the public... contemplated and bargained
for that particular artist, and no other would be expected to take his place. . . .'49 In the
companion case ofLumley v. Gye5° the court made clear that the law of personal services
is not restricted to contracts involving such unique services as an opera singer.5' The
court fails to see any fundamental difference between the services of an opera singer and
that of a shoemaker.5 2 "The personal service being in one case to make shoes, and in
the other to sing songs, it seems difficult to distinguish the cases upon principle: It is
the... personal service that gives the right [and not the nature of the services]. 5 3 Thus,
the nature of the services need not be unique or involve special knowledge or skills.4
Furthermore, the transaction need not even be cloaked in the guise of "trust and confi-

"Paige v. Faure, 127 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1920). "The general role is that rights arising of a contract cannot be transferred
if they are coupled with liabilities or if they involve a relationship of personal credit and confidence." Id. at 899.
SSee Swarts v.Narragansett Elm Lightng Co.,59A.77 (RJ 1904). "Iis easy to see that personal service.. .might
be a factor in electrical work, and upon such apossibilitycontracts have been held to be nonassignable." Id. at78.

See ira Section II.
'7See ifra Sections ILA.-B.
1 De G., M. & G. 604,619,622 (Ch. App. 1852).
Drewes v. FM Da-Sota Elevator Co. (It re Da-Sota Elevator Co.), 939 F.2d 654, (8th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
m
2 E. & R. 216 (Q.B. 1853).
SId.
'Id.

't Id. at 242. The court also used the following illustation: "The wrong and the injuy are surely the same, whether
the wrong-doer entices away the gardener, who has hired himself for a year,the night before he is to go to his

work...." Id. at 255. Note, this actually involves a cause ef action for tortious interference against a theater owner
who contracted away the services of an opera singer. However, it does serve to illustrate the breadth of the personal
service label to which the per se rule of nonassignabiity has been attached.
1

ld.
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dence." m In short, in "a right arising upon the contract of hire,the nature of the service
contracted for is immaterial." 6
As to the issue of assignability, the rule of per se nonassignability was firmly
attached to the personal services label by Justice Holmes in American Colortype Co. v.
ContinentalColortype Co.57 An assignment will not be allowed if a contract involves

a personal service.5 8 "Service is like mariage ...
[it may be repeated, but substitution
is unknown." 59

It has been argued that the courts have been unable to find a firm doctrinal basis for
determining the parameters of the labelling of contracts as personal. The result has been
diverging lines of cases involving other labelling devices within the personal service
label. The old common law stemming from Lwnley v. Wagner has been brought for6
wardeto
the 1990s. Itis no surprise that this old subjective labelling has been challenged
as being unresponsive to a "changed world."6 1 Professor Ian Macneil invokes the
changed world argument when he states: "[Tihe similarity-of-outcome patterns which
exist among such diverse relations as automobile dealer franchises, collective bargain-

ing, and the internal operations of corporations, have at the present time, few, if any
common doctrinal patems." 6 Professor Macneil summarizes the problem as "the
wisdom of attempting to [apply] the law of transactional contracts at a time when so

55

1d.

'Id. at232. Stating it in the old garb or "master-servant7 the Court in Blake v. Lanyon states that "a person who

contracts with another to do certain work for him is the servant of the other till the work is finished, and no otherperson
can employ such servant to the prejudice of the first master." 101 Eng. Rep. 521 (K.B.1795).
"188 U.S. 104 (1913).
"Id. at107.
Id. Ironically, the plaintiff-assignee won the case. Id. at 108. The court maneuvered around the nonassignability
rule by "finding" a novation. Id. It held that there was no assignment even though there was evidence of "consent"
given by the obligee. Id. Instead, it found that the original contract was discharged and a new employment contract
was formed. Id. Justice Holmes seemed to acknowledge the rue by stating, "indeed, long has smouldered as a dimly
burning question of the law." Id. See alsoAransas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U.S. 379 (1888).
" InMillerConstr. Co. v. First Indus. Technology Corp, 576 So.2d 748 (FHa. 1991), the court uses the personal service
label in a contract involving architectural design services to avoid the application of the doctrine of part
performance exception to the statute of frauds. The District of Columbia Ciruit Court hardens back in the 1973 case
of Clayman v. Goodman properties,Inc., 518 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The cowtdies Humble v. Hunter. 115 Eng.
Rep. 885,887 (Ex.1848), for a contracing party's "rightto the benefit... from the... substance of the party with
whom [he] contractfs]." The bell tolls loudly inthis case for the rule of nonassignability: "The opinion neither of
judge nor jury as to the capabilities of a replacement is acceptable as a substitute for the promisee's won judgenent
and tastes...." Id. at 1035-36.
"See infra Section V.A.
aIan R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contractds and Preentation, 60 VA L REV. 589,609 (1974).
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much contract law concerns relaonswhich much of the transactional doctrine is so illfitted to serve."63
It is now time to turn to the litany of Lmnley v. Wagner in order to examine the
evolution of a nile which made such good sense in 1852. The following is Lumley's
family tree which has beared a bit too many illegitimate fiuits.
1. Intent, Whether Fact or Fiction, As the Paramour
of Personal Service Nonassignability
Initially, the courts seemed to focus on the perceived intent of the parties in determining whether a contract was a nonassignable personal service. The natumre of the
contracted services was not considered important to this determination. Thus a contract
for services of an opera singer was not viewed any differently than a contract for the
services of a shoemaker."
The court in Paigev. Faure"held that an agreement for an automobile tire franchise
could not be assigned even when the assignee was one of the two original parties
(franchisees) to the agreement." This was despite thefactthat aprovision inthe franchise
agreement stated that it would "benefit the respective successors and assigns." The
court disregarded the express provision of the agreement, the fact that the assignment

wasnotto athirdparty, and thatthe nature ofthe agreementwas the sale oftires.6AInstead,
the court held that "[tihe intention of parties to a contract must be ascertained, not from
one provision, but from the entire agreement." The court implied the necessary intent
by applying the traditional personal service rationale of 'tnst and confidence.'" "[A]

0

Id. (emphasis added). The problems of applying the personal service fiction and its rule of per se nonassignability
have become increasingly apparent because of the complex nature of many oftoday's relational contracts and because
of the oourts ignoring the many transactional elements in these contracts. Alternatively stated, many of today's socalled personal service contracts possess many of the characteristics found in the transactional "sale of goods." See
infra Section V.A.1. Thus, the application o a per se nonassignability rule to personal service contracts is difficult
to Justfy. Priessort Macneil states:
[A] frank legal recognition of the relational nature of much contmctual behavior could relieve
transactional contract doctrine of the tremendo a pressure ofcopng with situationsforwhich it was
nwverdesigned.... The twisting offactanddoctrine and the fictions imposed in orderto reachsouMd

results within transactional rules can be and often are immense.
Ian R. Macoeil, The Many Futures of Corwacts, 47 S. CAL. L REV. 691, 815 (1974) (emphasis added).
U See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
e 127 N. 898 (N.Y. 1920).
"Id.

I1d. at 899.
"Id.
*Id.

' Id.
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contract cannot be transferredif [rights] are coupled with liabilities or if [rights] involve
a relationship of personal.., confidence."'
The negative side of the use of intention as the predominant test for personal service
nonassignability is that any contract can be made "personal" if it can be shown that the
parties intended it to be so. Such an unlimited use of the personal service label was
enumerated in Frissellet ux. v. Nichols: "It is competent for the parties to make any
contract a personal one no matterwhat the subject-matter. If the intention is manifested
by the parties... 3it effects the same object as where the law implies the intention from the
subject-matter
Almost a half century later, this contention that any contract can be made personal
and thus by implication, nonassignable, was reaffirmed in Clayman v. GoodmanProperties, Inc.' Thus, the innocent labelling that the services of an opera singer were
"personal" andperse nonassignable, had evolved into a universe of almost infinite fact
patterns which can justify applicationofpersenonassignabilty. The history of the 20th
century case law has been an unsuccessful attempt to quantify the notion of "personal"
and to rationalize theperse rule.7 The extent of this failure was illustrated in a recent
case. Despite over one hundred years of personal service jurisprudence, a court boldly
stated that "[there is no case law which specifically discusses the meaning of 'personal
services[!] '76
2. The Essence of the Subject Matter Must Be Personal
Another line of cases acknowledged that the analysis aimed at determining the
intention of the parties, by implication, was lacking and subject to abuse. Instead,
intention was to be viewed as only one factor in the analysis regarding assignability.
More importantly, the nature or subject matter of the contract has to be inherently
"personal." In Walker ElectricCo. v. New York ShipbuildingCo.- the court forwarded
a two-pronged test in order to determine the assignability of a subcontract to build
electrical switchboards for a navy ship.' "In determining whether... [there is] the right
to demand personal performance... we must consider first the subject matter of the

'

Id. Numerous courts have concluded any ontact based upon the "credit" of one of the parties must have been

intended to be personaL See Meager v. Ward, 30 S.W.853 (Tex.1895). See also Tdfon, T. & G.Ry. Co. v. Bedgood,

43 S.E. 257 (Ga. 1903).
- 114 So.431 (Fla. 1927).
7
Id. at 434 (emphasis added).
7 518 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
- 5Infra Section IEL
7'
Yellow Cab of Cleveland v. Greater Cleveland Regional Tmnsit Auth., 595 N.F2d 508,510 (Ohio CL App.1991).
- 241 F.569 (3d Cir 1917).
7
Id.
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contract and then the relation of the parties.""9 However, the court noted the difficulty
ofits undertaking to determine the personal nature of a given subject matter.9° In the end
the court applied theperse rule to what seemed to be a simple transaction in specialized
goods because 'it is difficult to exclude the personal equation."'
The focus on the nature of the subject matter 2 of a contract has done little to reign
in the breadth ofpersonal service labelling that was evident in the "intent of the parties"
cases. 3 Instead of a uniformity of decision as to what is by "nature" a personal service,
the courts have used different personal service rationales" to weave a decisional roadway filled with potholes ofinconsistency. The difficulty ofattempting to label a contract
as personal due to the nature of its subject matter was noted in the turn ofthe century case
of Swars v. NarragansettElectricLighting Co.8 The case involved a contract for the
installation of electric fixtures.8 ' The court stated that:
In the present case [we are] unable to say, as a matter oflaw,to whatexent
the personalservice... may have been important. [Such work] ... is not
amatterof suchcommonknowledge thatthe court can say how far it should
or should not be held to call for personal services ....
The court noted that this was a case "where the personal element may be as real [as a
painting of a portrait], though less apparent."' It concluded that the installation of
electrical fixtures was personal from "the nature of the work to be done. '6 9
The danger of basing perse nonassignability upon the nature of the subject matter
is well illustrated in the case of Johnson v. VckersO0 The case involved a contract to
" Id. at 574.
t0Id.
"Id.

The subject matter approach implies that there is some uniqueness to the contract that makes it a nonassignable
personal service contract.
A current example would be a contract for Luciano Pavarotti to appear.... In other words, he
spec& cexpeirieofaparticilaranist
ithesubjec-matterofthecontraa.Unique talent is involved;
the performers are not fungible. The same would be true of a top-flight talent in other professions.
A tortplaintiff hiring Melvin Belli or a fmnous surgeon would look askance at substitutionof lesser
luminaries
Drewes v. FM Da-Sota ElevatorCo. (In re Da-Sota Elevator Co.),939 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cr.1991) (emphasis added).
0 See supra Section ILA.I.
! Infra Secrion B.
H59 A.77 (R.L 1904).
Id. at 77.
5 Id. at 77-78.
ld. at 77.
Id. at78.
"120 N.W. 837 (Wis. 1909).
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construct and equip a canning factory 91 The court held that by its "nature" the contract
was personal since it involves special skill, knowledge and experience to construct such
a"complex plant."9 2 Inthis case the contractor assigned the contract without knowledge
ofthe adverse party.9 3 The factory was built according to prescribed specifications and
the assignee received the required certificate of completion from the adverse party's
executive committee. 4 Subsequently, the adverse party refused to accept the work and
to make payment.Y The court found for the adverse party because of the nature of the
subject matter.9 The assignment was perse invalid: 'tere [can] be no substitution of
1

contractors."

The application ofper se nonassignability to fully executed contracts are offered to
supportthe argumentthat the dangers ofperserules oftenoutweigh theirusefulness. The
dangers are magnified in this instance, when coupled with the courts subjectively using
the personal service ratibnales of "confidence," "trst," "skill," "knowledge," and "expertise" to label contracts "personal by nature." I next turn to a review of the history of
applying the above rationales in determining if a contract is nonassignable.
B. The Personal Service Rationales of "Trust"and "Confidence," "Skill,"
"Knowledge," and "Expertise"
In the courts labelling of contracts aspersenonassignable, they have wrestled with
such concepts as (1) trust, confidence, and (2) special skill, knowledge and expertise,"
in order to term contracts as personal. In fact, these terms have become the buzzwords
whose real meanings have become as unquantifiable as the "personal service" label they
are elicited to define. The following is a selective review of cases that have expressly

utilized these rationales. Also, I will analyze how some courts have attempted to sidestep
these expressed rationales and the harshness of the per se rule, by bifurcating personal
services into areas of personal and "tuly" personal."
91 Id. at 837-38.

2Id. at 838.
" Id.
" Id.
"Id.
"Id.
97Id.
" Mostof the cases seem tobepoafized between therationales of trust and confidenceversus cases which focus upon

the special skills, knowledge and/or expertise of the obligor Linn County Abstract Co. v. Beechley, 99 N.W. 702
(Iowa 1904), uses both poles of the personal service rationales tojustify its conclusion. However, it dearly separates
the rationales into two traditional poles. The case involved preparation of real estate abstracts. Id. at 702- In one
sentence the court states that "a thorough knowedge of real estate law [is] essential" Id. (emphasis added). In the
following sentence the court switches "poles": "In the employment of an abstracter, a high degree of trst and
comfldence is reposed." Id. (emphasis added). Also, other words have also been applied along with the above
rationales. Examples of other such rationales include: "talent," "credit," and "special training." See eg., Drewes

v. FM Da-Sota Elevator Co. (In re Da-Sota Elevator Co.), 939 E2d 654 (8th Cir. 1991).
Infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
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1. "Triust" and "Confidence"
Trust and confidence has been utilized many times to affix the personal service label
of nonassignability to contracts which would normally be assignable as "routine commercial fumctions. ''100 Thus, any contract can be made to be personal if it is imbued with
trust and confidence.101 For example, the court held in Linn County Abstract Co. v.
Beechleyw that a contract to provide title abstracts involved "a high degree of trust and
confidence"' 3 and could not be assigned.
One court put it very simply: "Do the terms of the contract seem to require [the]
personal confidence and skill on the part of the [obligee]?"0 4 When stated as such, it
would be difficult to find many contracts which do not "seem" to involve atleast acertain
degree of trust and confidenceY6 For example, it has been held that a contract to select
and fumish lecturers, musicians and entertainers was not assignable.1 6 This was despite
the facts that: (1) the contract possessed express assignment language, °7 (2) there were
allegations that the bookings were of the "same or better quality" than that which would
have been provided by the obligor t° and (3) thatthe obligee did not act in good faith by
failing to cooperate in producing the program. The court declined to My analyze the
above factual assertions. Instead, it held that the contract was not assignable and analogized it to the law of agency.'0 "It [is] somewhat in the nature of an agency contract, and
one involving a relationship of personal credit and confidence."" 0
Another area whereper se nonassignability has fimnly embossed its stamp, has been
in the area of insurance contracts. It has been universally held that insurance contracts

'

Lin Coumy Abstract Co., 99 N.W. 702.
See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.

" Linn County Abstract Co., 99 N.W. 702.
Id. Them had been m enormous increase in the number of title abstrac conipanies existing today. This is most
hkely due to the dramatic rise in real estate sales and the use of title insurance in real eate transactions. Thus, one
would be hard-pirssed todiaracteriz abstract preparation as a 'unique" skill. Futhennore, "um and confidence"
as ajustificaion is less forceful given the standardized nature of today's title requirements and the existence of state
licensing standards for title insurance companies.
'l In re Seiffert, 18 F.2d 444,445-46 (D. MonL 1926) (emphasis added). In this case, it was held that a contract to
providelabortofarm acertain pael ofland was a nonassignableperonal service ontract and ould notbeperformed
by the assignee's personal representative. Id. at 446.
's The blelihood of abuse of such subjective standards is obvious when framed by such a question.
'

Standard Oautsaqua System v. Gift, 242 P. 145 (Kan. 1926)
Id. at 145. The contract states that it "shall bind and benefit the parties thereto, their successors or assigns." Id.
'U Id. at 146.
'U

Id. "Inthelaw ofagency is to be found the old maxim 'dcegatu de/egare non prot'indicating thatthe power

of a agent is not assignable" Corbin, sapra note 1, at 206.
110Coshin, sra note 1, at 20. As to the express assignment language the cout held that the language was too
general and when interpreted as a whole the contract was one involving "personal credit and confidence" and not

assignable. Id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1994

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 27 [1994], Iss. 3, Art. 5

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:3,4

are by their "nature" not assignable when owners sell their properties. The rationale
usually asserted is that the insurance contract was issued based on the insurers trust and
confidence in the insured. This rationale can be challenged in a number of ways. First,
the true risk factors revolve around the nature and the hazards posed by the property itself
and not its owner. Second, insurance companies generally inspect commercial and
industrial properties from time to time to insure that the nature and use of the property
has not changed in a way to increase the insurers risk. As to residential homes, the
fungibility of the risk and of homeowner policies in general indicate that insurance
companies are unlikely to know or even care to know the homeowner. Trust and
confidence is unlikely to enter into their risk management equation. Third, nothing
prevents the courts from fashioning a similar test to that which has been utilized in the
area of landlord-tenant law."' The insurance company should be allowed to withhold
its consent to an assignment only if it can show that its risk has increased due to the
assignment. For example, a mortgagee endorsed in an insurance policy may assign it
when reselling its mortgage. This is allowed because the owner has remained the same
and therefore the insurers risk has remained unchanged. I would argue that the same test
or rationale should be applied if the owner attempts to assign the policy upon a sale: Does
the transfer increase the hazard or substitute a different risk, or is the hazard for all
purposes the same?112
A somewhat analogous area of the law is the ability of government officials, units,
or agencies to enter contracts binding upon a subsequent administration. It is generally
held that a contract involving a unitary performance or act may extend and bind a
subsequent administration. On the other hand, if the contract is for "personal or professional services" it maybe avoided by a successor administration."I Although, generally
upheld, this dichotomy has been difficult to apply in practice." 4 "[H]undreds of cases
found nationwide which in some fashion consider the subject, afford justification for
almost any result desired."' 115 This area of law lends further support to the difficulty of
quantifying "personal" and its "trust and confidence" rationales.,

"'See infra Section V.B. For example, the courts could impose upon insurance companies a "duty to investigate" the
assignee of the insurance contract and to offer a good faith reason for not consenting to the assignment
12 Central Union Bank of South Carolina v. New York Underwriters'Ins.Co., 52 F.2d 823,825 (4th Cit 1931). This
test was taken from a case which upheld the nonassignability of insurance contracts by the insured-owner. Id. at 827.
The question was posed regarding the assignment of a mortgagee's interest in the policy. Id. at 825.
11 See Mariano & Assoc., P.C. v. Sublete County Comm'rs, 737 P.2d 323 (Wyo. 1987).
114 Id. at 326.
11

Id.

See id.The courtheld thatthe services of an accounting firm didpossess the requisite "[t]rustand reliance, intrinsic
to certain personal service contracts." Id. at 331. It reasoned that such services were analogous to those of a lawyer
or doctor. Id. However, the court did acknowledge that such nonassignability "would not be available in the
magnitude of other business relationships." Id.
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Another code word for trust and confidence can be found in contracts requiring the
use of the "best efforts" of one of the parties. 7 This term is often implied in sales
representation, agency and promotional contracts."' Simply stated, a party may elect a
certain agent, salesperson, or promoter based on an implied belief that the individual or
company will use its best or "reasonable efforts"" 9 to promote the interests of the
contracting party. This is one area where the trust and confidence rationale serves a
useful purpose.Y2 Such contracts are at the core of the "personal" in personal service
contracts. Whatever new approaches are posed by this article21' or any other should find
these types of contracts to be nonassignable. I now turn to the other pole of personal
service rationales.
2. "Skill," "Knowledge," and "Expertise"
A classic example of the use of these rationales involved the issue of whether a
contract with an architectural firm involved special skill, knowledge and expertise. The
court answered the question strongly in the affirmative in Smith v. BoardofEducation.'"
It described the services provided by architects as follows: "The business of an architect
has the dignity of a learned profession. [It involves] person[s] of peculiar skill and
taste .... [Women and men ] of culture, of disciplined mind[s] artistic eye[s], and trained
hand[s]."'
It has been generally held that professional services are personal and
nonassignable based on the rationales enunciated in Smith v. Boardof Education.?
The nonassignability of contracts involving the so-called "learned professions"'2
is easier to justify. However, the application of these rationales to other professions is
more susceptible to criticism. For example, the court in EasternAdvertising Co. v,
n See Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 F.Supp. 1154 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
11

Some states have codified the "bestefforts" standard intolaw: "Alawful agreementby eitherthe sellerorthebuyer

for exclusive dealing... imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to supply the
goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale." TEX BUS. & CON. CODE ANN. § 2-306(b) (West
1968) (emphasis added). See also Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prods. Co., Inc., 801 F.2d 1001, 1009 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J., dissenting).
"1 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
' This was the finding in Don King Productions, Inc. v. Douglas, 742 ESupp. 741 (S.D. N.Y. 1990).
m See isfra Section IV.

m 222 P. 101 (Kan. 1924).
WId. at 101.
'u

See Corson v. Lewis, 109 N.W. 735 (Neb. 1906) (a contract forlegal services held to be'personal in nature, and

consequently unassignable); Deaton v. Lawson, 82 P.879 (Wash. 1905) (contract involving physician services held
to be nonassignable); Mariano & Assoc., P.C. v. Sublette Cry. Conun'rs, 737 P.2d 323 (Wyo. 1987) (held that
accounting services were professional services and nonassignable). In the age of health care plans and health
maintenance organizations (HMO's) it can be debated whether the nature of such services have changed to the point
to make physician services assignable. In fact, ofter times patients are limited as to their selection of physicians under
such plans.
I" See Smith v. Board of Educ., 222 P. 101 (Kan. 1924).
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Mcgaw2 6 held that a contract to make and display advertisements in street cars was
nonassignable because the obligee relied upon the skill and experience of the specific
company.12 In a more extreme case, acontract forprinting was held to be nonassignable
because the court"assumed" thatthe printer was chosen because of its qualifications and

"artistic skills.

128

It can be argued that the rationales of skill, knowledge and expertise provide the

courts a firmer basis'" than those involving the more vague notions of "trust and confidence." However, the farther the courts have moved away from the learned professions, the more difficult it is to distinguish the cases from those involving trust and
confidence. Some courts have attempted to avoid this confusing matrix of personal
service rationales. The following is one example of such an ill-fated attempt.

3. Personal Versus "'Tuly"Personal: The Bankruptcy Code Cases
A number of courts in the area of bankruptcy law have interpreted the Bankruptcy's
Code prohibition against the assignment of personal service contracts,'30 by a trustee in
bankruptcy, to apply only to contracts which are "truly personal"'13 The notion of

'a
12

42A. 923 (Md. 1899).
Id. at 925-26.
Campbell v. Board of Comm'r 67 P. 866,867 (Kan. 1902).

'
The rationales of unique skills, knowledge and ability have been utilized by courts to enforce "covenaut not to
compete"clauses. See, e8.,NcwEngadPatriots Football Club, Inc., v. Univ. ofColo., 592 F.2d 1196 (1 stCu 1979)
(football coach);, Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ.App. 1961)(football player).
Contra Smith, Wate, Knehn, Bumen & Hughes, Ltd. v. Bumnett, 548 N.E. 1331 (I31.App. CL 1989) (held that an
attorney did not possess exceptional or unique skills to warrant the enforcement of a negative covenant in an

employment contract). The uniqueness" requirementused to enforce covenants not to compete, also known generically as "negative covenants," was broadly extended in Mission Independent School Dist.v. Diserms, 188 S.W.2d
568 (Tex. 1945). The cor granted an injunction to prevent a public school music teacher from obtaining a similar
job anywhere in the statel Id. The court noted thatthe music teacherpossessed 'extraordinary and unique talents."
Id. at 568. See also the following cases involving thelaw of negative covenants: Equifax Serv., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d
1355 (10th Cir.1990); Pinov. Spanish Broadcasting System ofFla.,564 So.2d 186 (Fla. DiL. CL App. 1990); Safelite
Glas Corp. v. Fuller. 801 P.2d677 (Kan. CLApp. 1991); Alexander&Alexandernc. v. Koelz 722 S.W.2d311 (Mo.
C. App. 1986).
's The Bankruptcy Code states: "The trusee may not assume or assign any executory contract ...whether or not
such contract.., prohibits orrestricts assignment of rights ordelegation of duties, if...
applicable law excuses aparty
...to such cotract... from accepting performance frm... an entity other dum the debtor...." 11 US.C. §
365(cX1988). Personal service contracts aregenerallyconsiderednonassignable nder applicablelaw,"that being,
the state law being applied by agiven bankruptcy court. This seems tohave been the intent of the drafters of the Code:
"Second, executory contracts requiring the debtor to perforn duties nondelegable under applicable nonbankruptcy
law should not be subject to assumption against the interest of the nondebtor party." HOUSE COMM. ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OFTHE UNITED STA.E, H.R. DoC. No.137,93d Cong., IstSess. 199(1973). Furthermore.
'[a]
majority of Courts,which have considered IIU.S.C. § 365 (c) when confronted with an issue ofrnonassignability
havefound IIU.S.C. Sec.§ 365 (cXlXA) toapply tocontracts based upon personal services orskllsoruponpersonal
trust or confidence." 2 COLuIER ON BANKRUPTCY para. 365.05, at 365-42 (15th ed. 1989).
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something being "truly personal" as opposed to something which is "merely personal"
smacks ofanothersemantic attempt1 to limit the rule offnonassignability. These cases 33
turn the personal service rationales inside out.13 For example, the trust and confidence
rationale is cited, but some courts have indicated that trust and confidence must be the
primary basis of the contract in order to reach the level of truly personal."ts The court
in In re Varisco'3 ruled that a franchise agreement for the sale of baked goods was
assignable under the bankruptcy code.'- Nonassignment of personal service contracts
"is limited to executory contracts which are truly personal... [that are ones] that [are]
personal service contract[s] based on special trust and confidence.... ,,13
The weakness of attempting to quantify a transaction as "truly personal" was manifested in In re Sunrise Restaurants,Inc. 39 where the court held that the business of
operating a Burger King franchise required "no special knowledge."' 4 It reasoned that
it was strictly a business transaction for economic gai" 41 Citing In re Varisco,"2 the
court held that the debtor could assign its franchise agreement because the personal
service rationales were missing." 3 Once again the court's use of personal service rationales to avoid per se nonassignability is flawed. It is hard to accept that a franchise
involving millions ofdollars does not require a degree of special knowledge and business

"I1
The notion that there are differend degrees of personal, or alternatively stated, that not all personal service
contracts are personal enough to prevent an assignment has been previously stated. For example, the Seventh Circuit
Court coined the term "purely personal" in the case of Carlock v. LaSalle Extension Univ., 185 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.
1950). The case involved whether the personal representative of a deceased obligor, would be allowed to be
substituted in the "Exclusive Agency" Agreernen. Id. at 594-95. The court held that as a matter of law it was not
proven that the contract was personal enough to prevent the substitution. Id. at 595. It enunciated the following
standard: "No doubt the facts and circumstances of each particular case will be taken into account in determining
whether the contract is puely personalin its nature [to prevent substitution or assignment]." Id. (emphasis added).
" It is this underlying "semantic fog" of personal service contracts that this author believes requires the elimination
of the per se rule of nonassignability. As another stated, it is my "hope for a tool or device which will lead [us] out
of the semantic fog." Donald A. Wiesner & Albert E. Hamum, Materiality: The LegalRuleof Thumb, 4 AM. BUS.
L J. 58 (1966).
w See, e.g., In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymnouth, Inc., 134 B.R. 676 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (auto dealership
franchise agreement was not a personal service contract and is therefore, assignable); Secretat oftheArmyv.Terrace
Apartments, Ltd. (In re Terrace Apartments, Ltd.), 107 BR. 382 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
'31 Supra Sections I.B.I-2.
LO See Varisco v. Oroweat Food Co. (In re Varisco), 16 B.R. 634 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
'N

Id.
Id.

Id.at638. Even though a certain amount oftmst and confidence is inherently involvedin suchacontract involving
exclusive marketing and distribution rights, the court held that it was not"really a personal service contract based on
trust and confidence." Id. at 639.
1- 135 B.R. 149 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
'3

140 Id.

141Id. at 153.
10 Id.
10 Id.
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skill, along with a certain amount of trust and confidence in the assignee. The court
masked the true reason for allowing the assignment. Simply, the benefit to the debtor
of being able to sell a valuable asset, the franchise, outweighed any harm or increased
risk that such an assignment would have on the franchisor. The court stressed the facts
that the assignee was "no newcomer to fast food restaurant[s]"'" and that it was willing
to "infuse [a sizable amount of] working capital'4 into the franchise."
By clothing the nature of the franchise agreement in personal service contract rationale, the court missed an opportunity to forge a more straightforward approach to
assignability. 16For example, personal or not, the contract should be assignable because
the benefit to the obligee is great and the assignment would not cause any appreciable
harm to the obligor. In fact, the court expressly points out that the franchisor would "be
in no worse a position" after the assignment. 4 The-courts should no longer have to
justify its avoidance of nonassignability by utilizing personal service labelling and
rationales. Instead, new approaches need to be developed. These approaches would
allow assignment of any type of contract, if the facts of the particular case provide
adequate justification.
C. The Per Se Rule AgainstAssignability: A Preview
The coupling ofaperse rule of nonassignability to personal service contracts may
have made good sense when all "contractual relations were deemed strictly personal."
However, it now seems to serve primarily as a crutch for the courts. First, theperse rule
is a"nice"mechanical device forcourts to avoid a case by case analysis of assignability. 4
Second, courts have been unwilling to rationalize the many inconsistencies which have
developed in this area of assignments.'-1 The inconsistencies are many times the results
of acourt's attempt to skirt around the personal service label 1 in orderto avoid the harsh
I" Id. at 150. On one hand the court argues that operating a franchise required no special skill or knowledge to avoid
the personal service label. Id. at 153. On the other hand, it stresses the special skills of the assignee to furtherjustify
the assignment. Id.
14 Id.at 151.
1 See infra Section V.
"1 135 B.R. at 153.

14 JOSEPH M. PERLL. CONTRACTS 760 (2d ed. 1977). "Delectus Personae was the... catch phrase to indicate

that a party had a right to choose with whom he would deal." Id. However, it should be noted that unjust results are
inherent in any rigid application of personal service nonassignability to commercial transactions: "Rules and results
[of the English law courts] were articulated in terms of the supposed inherent nature of the rights involved and were
adhered to in circumstances which outraged both common and commercial sense." Robert Braucher Freedom of
Contractand the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L J. 598,608 (1969).
"9 "Probably no other area of the law of assignments is as confusing as the cases under this heading" (referring to
the nonassignability of personal service contracts) CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 17.

I' See Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prods. Co., Inc., 801 F.2d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 1986) ("When performance of
personal service is delegated, the trier merely determines that it is a personal service contract. If so the duly is per
se nondelegable." (emphasis added).
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results of the per se rule. I next turn to a review of some of these incoherencies in order
to examine whether the elimination of the per se rule of nonassignability is in order.
111. A REVIEW OF THE BRANCHES OF THE FAMILY TREE OF PER SE
NONASSIGNABILITY

The following is a synopsis of a number of cases within the personal service exception of the law of assignments. The issue to be examined is whether the uniformity of
decision expected from aperse rule515 actually exists in its application to assignability.
Lacking such uniformity would placetheperserule at odds with today's pro-assignment
trends.153 Included in this analysis is a look at the following topics: (1)the change in the
"legal form"'-' of the obligor and its relation to the rule of nonassignability, (2) the
assignability of franchises 55 and distributorships'56 and (3) NorthwesternCooperage,
Inc. line of pro-assignment cases.
A. The ChangeofForm Cases: Does a Changein the LegalForm ofthe ObligorWork
an Invalid Assignment?
The change of form cases, more than any other line of cases, suggest the unfortunate
path that the per se rule has taken. Earlier cases more uniformly held that any change5
in the form of the obligor worked an assignment in violation of the per se rle.
However, over time the courts began to differ as they became more result-oriented. The
harsh result of applying the per se rule to allow an obligee out of a contract, because of
any change in the form of the obligor, began to be questioned. The nature of business
transactions and of the parties had changed dramatically. At the turn of the century most
transactions involved individuals and partnerships. 158 However, the post World War II

ts See supra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
' Per se rules can be found elsewhere in the law. Certain restrictive practices have been held to be per se illegal
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). The application of this perse rule in the area of antitrust
has resulted in a more uniform decisional matrix than has been the case of perse nonassignability. For example, the
area of horizontal price fixing is universally regarded as something that is per se illegal.
' See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 17, at 760 (Today... the general proposition is that... duties are
delegable.') Another example of a pro-assignment stance in modem times is the Uniform Commercial Code. Id.
(citing U.C.C. § 2-210(1)(1977)).
"s4The "legal form" cases include the full range of changes possible in the law of business organizations: death of
a partner, replacement of a partner, incorporation, merger, acquisition, etc.
'u Definition of franchise: License to market a company's products or services, e.g., fast-food franchises.
ismDefinition of distributorship: One who distributes another's goods or products, e.g., a wholesale dealer. The
distribution network that exists in a free market economy.
i See, e.g., Nassau Hotel Co. v. Barnett & Barse Corp., 106 N.E. 1036 (N.Y. 1914).
s For example, the principle of master-servant was still a dominant theory.
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era has seen the rise of the corporation as the dominant means of doing business.'
Furthermore, the growth of the service sector of the national economy was at least
partially aided by "the development of franchising and other relational techniques."' 1
The per se rule of nonassignability could no longer be applied without some repercussions to ordinary commercial transactions. Thus, an increasing number of courts began
to find that certain changes in form did not result in an invalid assignment.
A number of early cases dealt with the substitution of parties in both formal and
informal partnerships. The courts generally held that any tinkering with the partnership
worked an invalid assignment of a personal service contract. Thus, the retirement,""
death, or substitution'1 of a partner allowed obligees of the partnership the ability to
terminate their contractual obligations. For example, the 1920 case ofPaige v. Faure63
dealt with an"exclusive agency" to sell a dealer's automobile tires. '" The court held that
the dealer had a right not to renew the contract because one of the two obligors had sold
his interest to the remaining obligor.'6 This was despite the existence of pro-assignment
language in the contract.' 66 The court's rationale was that the contract was based upon
the "confidence" and "reasonable efforts" of both partners and not just the one.'6 A
similar case held that an employment contract was not assignable to the remaining
partner of a three person partnership.' 6" The court used similar reasoning to prohibit the
assignment.' 69 "[I1t must be presumed, that in entering into the contract [the employe,
took into consideration] ... the experience, industry and business producing ability of
[all three and not just one of the partners]. ' '*'1
In the area of legal changes involving the corporate form, the courts have been more
willing to allow an assignment. However, they have used different rationales to justify
their decisions. For example, one early common law case simply reasoned that any

's Macneil, supra note 62, at 694-95. Professor Macneil states that the past fifty years has been characterized by
"the increasing dominance of corporate and ongoing intercorporate methods of doing business." Id.
11 Id. at 694.
See Smith v. Board of Education, 222 P. 101 (Kan. 1924) (retirement of a partnerin an architectural firm).
See Hardy Implement Co. v. South Bend Iron Words, 31 S.W. 599 (Mo. 1895).
,0 127 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1920).
"

"7

Id.

Id. at 899.
Id. at 899.
I7
"Id. "In view ... of the... exclusive agency given them, it is fairly to be implied that they were to devote their
time and do whatever was reasonable and necessary to selling ... the product." Id.
" Leet v. Jones, 139 So. 711 (La. C. App. 1932). This case involved an employment contract with an accounting
firm. Id. at 711. The accounting firm was dissolved with the understanding that one of the partnerswould continue
the business. Id. at 711-12.
,0 Id. at712.
"7

1-m Id.
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contract involving a corporation could not be personal."" Therefore, a contract to build
a railway was freely assignable by the corporate-obligor.'7
However, another court from the same state held that a corporation is, in fact, a
"person."'' A "corporate personality" is manifested in the charter rights of the corporation.'7 4 The court reasoned: "In dealing with natural persons in matters of trust
and confidence, personal character... may be a dominant factor. In similar transactions with a corporation, a substitute for personal character is the charter rights of the
corporation...."175
The first logical approach was enunciated by Justice Traynor in Trubowitch v.
Riverbank CanningCo.' 7 6 Justice Traynor announced an "effects test.' 77 The validity
of an assignment due to a change in the legal form of the obligor would depend upon"it[s]
effects [on] the interests of the parties protected by the nonassignability of the contract."' 78 Thus, an assignment was notperse invalid merely due to a change in the legal
form '" of one of the parties. 80 Justice Traynor's2approach was expressly adopted by
l
other courts within 8 ' and outside of California. '
" New Eng. Iron Co. v. Gilbert Elevated R.R. Co., 91 N.Y. 153 (N.Y 1883).
17 Id. at 167. The court reasoned that the contract could not involve a "personal relation or confidence" because a

corporation was not a person. Id.
171New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving & Printing, 73 N.E. 48 (N.Y 1905). The case
involved the exclusive right to sell a manufacturer's printing press. Id. at 48-49. A corporation holding the right
transferred it to a successor corporation. Id. at -1,9.The court held that the transfer was invalid. Id. at 52-53.
174ld. at 52.
175 Id.

1- 182 P.2d 182 (CaL 1947).
17 Id. at 188.

" Id. This case involved the dissolution of a corporation with a transfer of all its assets to another company owned
by its sole shareholders. Id. at 184-85. The court pointed out that all the management personnel remained the same.
Id. at 189. Goodwill may be another factor a court could look at in making a determination of whether a change in
form worked an assignment. That is, has the goodwill of the business been detrimentally impacted by the change of
form?
" Id. It is here that we may see a possible model to replace the rule of per se nonassignability. That is, the
assignability of a personal service contract could be determined based upon its "effects" on the other party.
" An interesting aside is how courts have dealt with the enforcement of"ovenant not to compete" clauses involving
personal services. The courts have generally held that reasonable noncompete clauses in employment and business
sale contracts are assignable. See Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355 (10th Cir. 1990) (employment contract);
Pino v. Spanish Broadcasting System of Florida, 564 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1990) (employment contracts); Safelite Glass
Corp. v. Fuller, 807 P.2d 677 (Kan. 1991) (sale of a business). ("The general rule appears to be that valid covenants
not to compete are assignable. ... ") See also Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986).
"' People v. McNamara Corp., 104 Cal. Rpr. 822 (Cal. CL App. 1972). This case involved a foreign corporation
who entered into a contract to do state highway work. Id. at 823. It subsequently set up a subsidiary corporation in
the state and assigned the contract. Id. at 824. In holding the assignment to be valid tnder the "effects test," the court
reasoned that: "The contracting parent corporation had... an unaltered duty... toperform... ; and [had]... complete
control over the subsidiary as the means of performing that duty." Id. at 826.
'0 Ruberoid Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 235 A.2d 875 (Md. 1967). A sole proprietor entered into a subcontract
to construct a floor on a school building project. Id. at 876. Subsequently, he incorporated the business. Id. at 877.
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B. FranchisesAnd Distributorships:Is a ZebraWhite With Black Stripes or Black
With White Stripes?
Contemporary business practice has seen the development of new and innovative
contractual means of doing business, including franchises, distribution, licensing, and
marketing agreements. Although similar in nature, the courts have labeled these arrangements differently for purposes of assignability. Once again the courts have attempted to
differentiate based on old personal service labelling. BerlinerFoodsts is one of"a long
line of cases' that make the propriety of delegating the performance of a distribution
contract depend on whetherornotthe contractcalls for thedistributor's personal (unique,
irreplaceable, distinctive, and therefore, nondelegable) services."'" The court in Sally
Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co., Inc.'" held that a distribution contract to sell a
manufacturer's hair care products was not assignable.1' Another court held that a
contract between a gas distributor and a gasoline service station, also, was not assignable.'
On the other hand, the courts have been more willing to allow the assignment of
franchises. For example, an automobile franchise'5 9 and a franchise to bake and distributebread'o have been held to be assignable and not contracts "based on specialtrust and
confidence."'' It is unclear how a court distinguishes between the "trust and confidence" enunciated in the earlier personal service contract cases t92 and "special trust and

Despite a nonassignment clause in the contract, the court upheld the assignment because it did not "adversely affect"
the contractor-obligee. Id. at 880. The court reasoned that the contractor was protected because it had the ability to
pick any subcontractor, could withhold payment, and could have required aperformance bond. Id. See alsoMunchak
Corp. v. Cunningham. 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1972); Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d at 311.
"o Berliner Foods Corp. v. Pillsbury Co., 633 F.Supp. 557 (D.Md. 1986).
1N See Detroit Postage Stamp Serv. Co. v. Schermack, 146 N.W. 144 (Mich. 1914); Paigev. Faure, 127 N.E. 898 (N.Y.
1920).
'" Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prods. Co., Inc., 801 F.2d 1001, 1009 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting).

801 F.2d at 1001.
Id. at 1008. The key part of the court's argument was that the assignment was invalid because it was to a
competitor" or the manufacturer. Id. at 1007. The court viewed this primarily as a conflict of interest problem. Id.
at 1008. However, it should be noted that the district court found it to be a nonassignable personal service contract.
Berliner Foods Corp. v. Pillsbury Co., 633 F.Supp. 557 (D.Md. 1986). The circuit court stated that the district court
may be correct, but there was not enough evidence on the record for it to determine whether the contract was entered
into based upon "personal confidence and trust." 801 E2d at 1004-05.
I" O'Brien v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 699 F.Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (court held a portion of Georgia's Gasoline
Marketing Practices Act unconstitutional for requiring a distributor to give a reason in writing for withholding its
conasent).
IN In re Tom Stimus Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 134 B.R. 676 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
'9'Variso v. Oroweat Food Co. (Inre Varisco), 16 B.R. 634 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
9 Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
9a Supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
"'

"'
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confidence" in some of the more recent cases. The problem with this distinction is
evident when one compares the following two cases involving fast food restaurant
franchises. In In re Sunrise Restaurants,Inc.,193 the court allowed the assignment of a
Burger King franchise.1 4 It held that operating such a franchise did "not require...
special knowledge [or] judgment, taste, skill or ability."' " Contrast Schupack v.
McDonalds System, Inc.196 where the court held that a right of first refusal was "personal" and could not be assigned by a prospective franchisee.' The court described
personal as a contract involving reliance upon a party's "trust and confidence." 1
C. Northwestern Cooperage: The Pro-Assignment Cases
The law has not been uniform in its stand against assignability in this area of the law
of assignments. Aline of cases t99 stemming from the 1903 NorthwesternCooperage"
case worked from a mind set of favoring assignability and viewed most commercial fact
situations in that light. Instead of focusing on the personal element in the contract, the
court took a stand that when in doubt, assignability should be favored: "I think that the
true doctrine is that where an executory contract is not necessarilypersonalin its character... it is assignable."2'
A line of Michigan cases followed that applied and extended the doctrine of Northwestern Cooperage. Contracts to build a factory in exchange for tax abatements, to
purchase steam heat, to transport gravel on credit, and a contract to construct a
telegraph system' were all held to be assignable.
19 135 B.R. 149 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
1' Id.

Id. at 153.
1" 264 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 1978).
'

197 Id.

'"Id. at 830-31. McDonald's president, Ray Kroc, stated that he would grant a Right of First Refusal based on the
following standard: "Ifl got that funnybone feeling; if Igot that feeling of trustand faith and confidence, then I would
give iL" Id. at 831.
I" A early line of cases includes Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N.Y. 8 (N.Y. 1875). Devlin was one of the first cases to
enumerate the "not necessarily personal" terminology. See id. at 16.

2w Northwestern Cooperage & Lumber Co. v. Byers, 95 N.W. 529 (Mich. 1903). This case involved the assignment
of contract in which a stave mill company agreed to build and operate a factory in exchange for use of land and tax
abatements. Id. at 530.
201 Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
20 95 N.W. at 529.
20 Voigt v. Murphy Heating Co., 129 N.W. 701 (Mich. 1911).
201 C.H. Little Co. v. Codwell Transit CO., 163 N.W. 952 (Mich. 1917). The case involved a factor of credit given

to the obligee. Id. at 952. This has generally been held to be fatal to assignability. The courts have argued that credit
is necessarily "personal." Nonetheless, this court concluded: "It is difficult to see how the personal element entered
into the contract involved here." Id. at 953.
" Detroit T. & L R. CO. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 166 N.W. 494 (Mich. 1918) "The so-called personal element
which enters into it is very small." Id. at 495.
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Thus, the NorthwesternCooperageline of cases demonstrate that a finding of trust,
confidence, skill, knowledge, and expertise need not be the death knell of assignability.
Instead, a court may still hold a contract to be assignable if it is"notnecessarily" personal.
However, the courts have been down this path before." The fundamental problem
remains: What approach or approaches should the courts use to draw the line of demarcation between "personal" and "not necessarily personal"?' What contracts should be
assignable despite the personal element? It is these two questions to which I now turn.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PER SE RULE: SHOULD ASSIGNABILITY
BE ALLOWED?
The preceding review of the case law and comment on the rationales contained
therein illustrates that the time has come to expressly remove the facade of per se
nonassignability.2 08 Given the scope and sophistication of today's transactions, the
continued application of aperse rule serves a disservice to our jurisprudence' and to
the stability of our commercial transactions. 210 I now turn to an examination of some
possible approaches to assignability.
A.

"MaterialChange" or "Adversely Effects" Test

This approach was hinted at in the review of the Trubowitch line of cases.2 ' The
traditional focus in personal service contract nonassignability has been in two areas: (1)
the expressed intent of the parties2 12 or (2) the intent of the parties implied from the nature
24
21 3
of the subject matter or duty to be performed. JusticeTraynor's "effects test shifted

See supranotes 130-47 and accompanying text ("personal" versus "truly personal").
The courtinMacKayv. Clark Rig Bldg. Co.,42 P.2d341 (Cal. Dist. CL.App. 1935),tookadiffereattack. Itfocused
on whether the services were of "such a character that they may be as well performed by others." Id. at 348. This
test for assignability seems tobe superiortotheNorthwesternCooperage's coinage of the "not necessarily personal"
doctrine. It has the sound of being more empirical and is at least one step removed from the old personal service
baggage.
20
TheCourtinMariano&Assoc. P.C. v. SubletteCountyComm'rs,737P.2d 323,326 (Wyo. 1987), statedtheissues
as follows: "[The first. .. decision [is] whether [the] exception-dominated subject retains sufficient specificity or
vitality to deserve retention as a court-created principle. Id. at 326. This author believes the answer is no regarding
per se nonassignability.
2 "The legal relations created by any particular contract must be analogized and the assignability of each one must
be considered separately." Corbin, supra note 1 at 208.
" This article has shown that the application of the per se role of nonassignability has been anything but rational
or stable.
21"Supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
21 Supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
21 Supra notes 77-97 and accompanying text.
23 Trobowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 182 P.2d 188 (1947).
21

2
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the focus away from the intent of the parties to the effect the specific assignment in
question would have upon the party intended to be protected by nonassignability.21
The question then becomes does the assignment "materially change" the duty to be
performed? Or, alternatively, does the assignment adversely affect the interests of the
other party? The latter question was the one posed by Justice Traynor. However, it has
been mostly applied in the change oflegal form cases. The author believes that such an
approach should be expanded and applied to every contract assignment. The personal
element would be only one factor inthe determination of whetherthe assignment is likely
to have an adverse effect.
The issue then becomes is any potential adverse effect (e.g. risk ofnonperformance)
enough to prohibit an assignment? It is offered that the negative answer more strongly
2
promotes good public policy. The adverse effect must be of the type that materially
changes or alters the performance of the duty. A number of courts have applied this
standard to the assignability of personal service contracts. For example, one court held
that a television anchorman's employment contract was assignable" because it did not
"vary materially the duty of the obligor, increase materially the burden of risk imposed
by the contract, or impair materially the [the anchorman's] chance of obtaining return
performance." 218 In short, there was "no material change in the contract obligations and
duties of the employee."219

21 The vice to be avoided is not the enforcement of specific nondelegation or nonassignment clauses negotiated by

the parties. At issue is only the assignability of oontracts silent about assignment. See, eg., Rather-Gallagher v.
Montana Power Co.. 522 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Mont. 1974), where the Couri upheld the express "provisions for
nonassigment in acontract." Itnoted the effects test applied in Trubowitch butfailed toapply itbecause of the express
nonassignability clause. Id. However, courts have used other means, such as waiver and estoppel to avoid the
enforcement o a nonassigrnent clause. See Siliman v. Twentieth Cenury-Fox Film Corp., 144 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y.
1957).
' Numerous legal doctrines, causes of actions, and defenses pivot on the question ofmateriality. For example, in
the area of aocounting, the GeneraflyAcceptedAuditing Standards (GAAS) uses materialityas ts"operativeparameter." 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, U.S. Auditing Standards AU Sec. 312.01-04 (Statement on Auditing
Standards Nx 47) (Am. Inst.of Cenifed Pub.Acamutants) (CCH 1990). "Auditors considerthemselves responsible
fordetecting only materialmisstatements. Materialityis a relativetenn referring to the magnitude ofthe misstatement
compared with the total financial activity of the enterprise under audit." Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelley,
Accountants'LiabilityToThirdPariesForNeglienMisrepresentation:
The SearchForANewLitrningPrinciple.
30A.M BUS. L J. 345,410-11(1992). See alsoWiesner & Harwn, supranote 132; Egan. supra note 7. "The most
significant factor determining materiality of a breach is the extent to which the breach will deprive the injured party
of the benefit... [of] the exchange." Id. at 276 (citing E.ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 612 (1982)).
'" Evening News Ass'n v. Peterson, 447 F.Supp. 77 (D.C.1979).
2
a Id. at 80 (citing 4 A. CORBIN,CONTRACTS § 868; RE9rAEM
(FNt'IR)OF CONTRACMh § 152 (1932).
25 Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d 31l 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). See alsoMunchak Corp. v.
Cunningham, 457 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.1972); Decatar North Assoc. v. Builders Glass Inc., 350 S.E.2d 795 (Ga. 1986).
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This approach to assignability has been proposed in the Restatement of Contracts,2
has been adopted by the Uniform Commercial Code, ' and has been applied in the area
of requirement and output contracts.' It appears that a similar approach would be
effective to determine the assignability of any contract, including so-called personal

service contracts. At the least, this approach could be a part of a cluster of standards to
be used in place of per se nonassignability.
Another developing issue is whether a change in key corporate personnel should be
considered paramount to an assignmenL Does a change in personnel "materially alter"

the contract? In the past, the answer has been in the negative. m However, the answer
may not be as clear, today. The presence of key personnel may have been an implied part
of the basis of the bargain. This may be especially true in the entertainment and creative
arts industries."' The personnel within the corporation can be more important than the

corporation itself. For example, a motion picture producing corporation may be sold to
anothercompany resulting in a change inkey personnel. The general rule is that a change
in the corporate form does not prevent the assignment of contracts held by the predeces-

sor corporation. ' However, that same corporation would normally be prohibited from

" See RESTATEMENT(FIRST) OFCONTRACTS. § 151(1932). "[Anassignmentis] effective... unless [it]... would
vary materially the duty of the obligor, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed upon him by his contract,
or impair materially his chance of obtaining return performance .. " Id. See alsoRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, § 317 (1981).
-21Article 2 and Article 2A of the Uniform Comnmercial Code deal with the sale and lease of goods. Its assignability
provision is similar to the RESTATEMENT. See U.C.C. § 2-210(2)(1977).
2" SeeAnnotationAssignabilityofContract toFurnishAll ofBuyerrsRequirementor To Take All ofSeller's Output,
39 A.LR. 1192 (1925). It states: 'Although no court has put it that way, a study of the decisions indicates that the
question of assignabilitydepends, not upon the provisions of the contract, but upon whether its enforcement by the
assignee will render it more onerous upon the otherparty." Id. at 1192 (emphasis added).
2
In the earlier cases the courts simply looked at the corporations and not the personnel within the corporation. "It
is true that in dealing with corporations a party cannot rely on what may be termed the human equation in the
company." New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving & Printing Co., 73 N.E. 48,52 (N.Y. 1905).
More recent cases have recognized the importance of the personnel within a corporation. However, the author has
been unable to find any case which prohibited an assignment or allowed a party out of a contract because of a change
in personnel See e.g., Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham 457 F.2d 721,725 (4th Cia 1972). ("To us it is inconceivable
that the rendition os services by a professional basketball
player... could be affected by the personalities of successive corporate owners.!) Evening News Ass'n v. Peterson,
477 F.Supp. 77.79 (D.D.C. 1979). ("The close, intimate and personal relationship [plaintiff] points to as characterizing his assocation [with the personnel of the selling corporation] was highly subjective....")
224 This was the key issue in a recent lawsuit brought by rock starGeorge Michael. "A Top Star Says ofSony He Wants
Out," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1993, at C13. Mr. Michael is attempting to invalidate a long-term recording contract he
had signed with CBS Record who was subsequently acquired by the Sony Corporation. Id. He argues that the change
in personnel has stunted his growth as an artist and should be grounds to dissolve the long-term contract. Id. "[S ince
the Sony Corporation bou ght my contract,... I have seen the great American music company that I proudly signed
to as a teenager become a small part of a production line for a giant electronics corporation who ... have no
understanding of the creative process." Id.
2
See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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delegating its duties to another company so as "to deprive the other party of the contemplated performance of certain 'stars', directors, orotherkey figures within the delegating
corporation's structure.'" 26
Two arguments can be raised to support the status quo that a change in corporate
personnel does not result in an assignment. First, when contracting with a corporation
it is foreseeable that a change in the corporation and its personnel is likely.m Second,
in the age of hundred page contracts and specialized law firms, the parties should be able
to negotiate provisions dealing with the change of personnel issue. However, the use of
a materially change or alter approach to assignability may make it difficult to avoid this
issue.
B. The "Adequate Assurance" Test
Another possible approach would be that an assignment should be allowed if the
assignor or the assignee can provide "adequate assurance" to the obligee regarding
performance. This approach could be coupled with the preceding "material change"
approach. For example, if it is unclear whether the assignment works a material change
of the contract, it should be allowed if adequate assurance is provided.'
The law provides existing "adequate assurance" models that can be used for guidance. For example, in the law of mortgages an entire body of law has developed in the
area of assumability 2 9 At one time almost all mortgages were freely assumable. However, recent decades witnessed the wide use of "due-on-sale" provisionsm° which prevent the assumption of a mortgage. Today, generally the only mortgages that may be
assumed are government guaranteed residential loans.23 Prior to 1989 these mortgages
were freely assumable. 23 Subsequently, the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-

"" CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 17, at 762 n.83.
227 See Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Koelz, 722 S.W.2d 311,313 (Mo. CL App. 1986).

The issue of whether assurances can be utilized to offset even severe alterations in the duties to be performed will

be left to the courts to fine tune. This would likely entail a factual analysis of the change, along with the proposed
assurances.

Assumption is the term used when someone sells a parcel of real estate and an existing mortgage is transferred
along with the land to the new owner. Assumption is in essence an assignment of the mortgage obligations of the
mortgagor.
2" Due-on-sale provisions provide for an acceleration of all amounts owing under a mortgage in the event of a "sale"
by the mortgagor. Sale has been construed to include any transfer or conveyance of title.
231 These are loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA).

" "Freely assumable" is interpreted by some as the releasing of the original mortgagor from liability to repay the
mortgage upon the transfer of the property to a new owner. The government's only recourse upon default would be
against the new owner. However, the exact language in the mortgage instrument will determine whether: (1) an
assumption is allowed without the consent of the mortgagee and (2) if allowed, whether the assumption releases the

original mortgagor from further liability. If the assumption does not release the original mortgagor, then she would
remain liable upon default She would then be able to seek damages against the assuming party.
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opment will release the original mortgagor from liability if adequate assurance is given
as to the ability of the assuming party to make the payments2 33

Other examples of the use of assurance principles can be found in the Bankruptcy

Code23' and in the Uniform Commercial Code. 2-3 The Uniform Commercial Code
provides that the obligee may "demand adequate assurance of due performance and until
he receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance
for which he has not already received the agreed return."236
The Bankruptcy Code contains a number of provisions requiring the trustee to
provide adequate assurance to contracting parties of the debtor.3 Section 365(b)(3)
provides an example of how an adequate assurance model may be utilized to safeguard
the interests of the obligee and still allow for an assignment 2 It provides that before

the trustee can assign alease in a shopping center she must provide adequate assurance.
The Code then lists anumber ofelements which can be considered in making an adequate
assurance determination: (1) "financial condition and operating performance"° of the
proposed assignee, (2) the percentage rent due under the lease "will not decline substantially," 21 and (3) the assignment "will not disrupt any tenant mix or balance."
This type of assurance model should be utilized to allow the obligor a greater ability
to assign his rights and duties under a contract. Furthermore, if it is unclear whether an
assignment may "materially change" the contract, then assurance may provide the vehicle to allow the assignment and at the same time to allay the concerns of the obligee.

2" This normally entails a review of the credity history of the prospective mortgagor.

11 U.S.C. §§ 365(b), (0(1988).
U.C.C. §§ 2-210(5), 609 (1977).
2- 1d.§2-609(1). Furthermore, the obligee may negotiate directly with the assignee for adequate assurances without
risking a claim of waiver as to the original obligor:. "The other party may treat any assignment which delegates
performance as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and may without prejudice to his rights against the assignor
demand assurances from the assignee." Id. §2-210(5).
- See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(b)(l)-(0(2)(B)(1988).
2 See In re Sunrise Restaurants, Inc., 135 B.R. 149 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (adequate assurance in assignment of
fast food franchise). See alsoIn re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (prospective assigne's
history oflosses and its failure to meet required capital requirements weighed against a finding of adequate assurance).
- 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(1988). Even though this section deals with the lease of real estate, such leases may still
be construed as personal service contracts. For example, in a shopping center the personal elements may be central,
e.g., management and marketing skills, along with taste and reputation, are vital in operating such a center or a store
within the center.
24 Id. § 365(b)(3)(A). For legislative history see S. REP. No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Seas. 59 (1978); H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 348-49 (1977).
-1 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(B)(1988).
2 Id. § 365(b)(3)(D).
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C. A "Factors"Test: Antonelli's "Particularized,PracticalApproach"
The court in the 1992 case of In re Antonelli4 3 coined the following language in
referring to theperse rule of nonassignability: "Application of the rule, however, calls
for a particularized, practical approach rather than a conceptual one to the assignment
question."2 4 This approach would look to the fact pattern of a particular case for
"factors" that can be balanced by the courts in making a determination on the issue of
assignability. A number of potential factors that may be scrutinized by the courts
include: (1) whether the party to the contract is "adversely effected," (2) whether
"adequate assurance" can be given by either the obligor or her assignee, 24 (3) the
"fungibility" of the service being rendered, and (4) are the elements of discretion and
supervision required in the performance of the duty. These factors, among others, can
be weighed by the courts in reaching a decision on assignability.
1. Is a Party "Adversely Affected" By An Assignment?
A fundamental factor in the analysis is whether the original obligor remains liable
afterthe assignment. For example, under the Uniform Commercial Code the delegatingobligor remains primarily liable ifthe assignment is without the consent of the obligee. 2"
However, the assignment remains legal and the original obligor's liability would be
removed upon the satisfactory performance by the assignee.'
Of course, the per se rule of nonassignability prevents the issue of multiple liabilities, that of the obligor and her assignee, from ever being raised. The facts of a particular
case may dictate whether a "true assignment" ' is allowed or whether the obligor
remains liable after the assignment.
Nonetheless, the remaining liability of the obligor should be one factor to be weighed
on whether to allow an assignment.219 If, for example, the assignor expressly agrees to
remain liable for the performance of the assignee then the pendulum should swing in

2

148 B.R. 443 (D.Md. 1992).
Id. at 448.

1* Supra notes 228-42 and accompanying text.
"No delegation of performance relieves the party delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for breach."
U.C.C. § 2-210(1)(1977).
2" See Corbin,supra note 1, at 213. "A duty can never be escaped by... delegation but any duty can be extinguished
by performance." Id. at 217.
2" By "true assignment" the author means where the performance of the assignee is substituted for that of the obligorassignor and the latter party is released from any further liability in the case of nonperformance.
" See Western Oil Sales Corp. v. Bliss & Wetherbee, 299 S.W. 637,638 (Tex. 1927) ("The mere fact that a contract
is invested.., with the quality of assignability, does not signify that eitherparty may, by assigning the contract, release
himself from liability under it.").
2"
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favor of assignability. As one commentator phrased it: "The other party is thus not
frustrated from having the right to enforce [the] contract against the person on whose

credit and reputation she relied."20
2. "Fungibility" Of The Services To Be Rendered

The degree that the services are "fungible" should aid a court in a finding of
assignability. Asample test for fungibility is the availability of substitute performance-"'

The court in Pingleyv.Brunson 2 held that the "general rule [is] that ifthe subject matter
of a contract is such that its substantial equivalent is readily obtainable from others," then

relief is not warrantedV5t The court in In re Da-Sota Elevator Co.Z cited Lumley v.
Wagner -l andthen determined that its logic did not apply to the assignmentofanelevator
maintenance contract3" It acknowledged that "skilled workmanship" was required to
perform the service and that confidence in the particular obligor was a factor in the
contracting decision." 7 Nonetheless, it allowed an assignment of the contract, reasoning
that it involved a"more routine commercial function"'2 " and did not require "outstanding
genius. '

9

Our increasingly fungible world may be attributed to a number of factors: (1) the

tremendous expansion in the service sector of our economy,' ° and (2) the increased
standardization of services. For example, today's transactions have been standardized

26 CALAMARI & PERLLo, note 17, at P. . See also Grismore, supra note 4, at 318 ("The most that can
happen ... is that the assignor will be subjected to liability for damages ... ").
211This test can be applied as in the preceding section to the substituted performance of the particular assignee.
"Delegation... is permitted unless a substantial reason can be shown why the substitute performance will not be as
satisfactory as personal performance" ROSKOWSKI, supranote 37, at 262. In this Section the focus is on the
availability of substituted performance or the fungibility of the service in general.
- 252 S.E.2d 560 (S.C. 1979). This case involved a suit for specific performance and an injunction against an organ
player. Id. at 560. Evidence indicated that this particular organ player was a crowd favorite. Id. at 560. However,
the court held that the player's talent was not unique enough and denied the relief. Id. at 561.
I'
Id.
939 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1991).
I De. G.,M. & G. 604, 619,622 (Ch. App. 1852).
2" 939 F.2d at 655-56.
2- Id. at 656.
2 Id. We saw similar reasoning given in In re Sunrise Restaurants, Inc., 135 B.R. 149 (Bankr. NLD. Fla. 1991). The
court held that operating a fast-food restaurant was a "strict business transaction" not involving special abilities. Id.
at 153.
2" 939 F.2d at 656. The court noted that the short-term nature of the ocntract would be motivation for the assignee
to "demonstrate their skill and reliability" in order to persuade the obligee to renew the oontract. Id. See also MacKay
v. Clark Rig Bldg. Co., 42 P.2d 341 (Cal. Dist. C. App. 1935).
m See sources cited supranote 3.
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by awide array of consumerprotectionlaws,26 1 warranty statutes,26 2 and professional and
nonprofessional licensing laws.263 This was noted by Judge Posner in arguing that an
assignment to a possible competitor of the obligee may still be valid because today's
transactions are not as affected by their relational aspects. 2" "[Jiudges can go astray by
assuming that the legal-services industry is the pattern for the entire economy... What
in law would be considered a fatal conflict of interest is in business a commonplace and
legitimate practice.'
Some have argued that the greater the degree of supervision or
discretion required by the contract makes the duty less fungible and more likely to be
nonassignable. Inowtumtothe ideaofsupervisionordiscretion as afactorin assignability.
3. Yellow Cab's Dichotomy: "Discretion" Versus "Specificity"
The 1991 Yellow Cabof Cleveland v. GreaterCleveland RegionalTransitAuthority9 " case stressed the importance of discretion in the determination of assignability.267
Altematively, the greater the specificity within the contract on how the duties are to be
performed, the easier it is for a court to allow an assignment. The court's mind-set in
allowing the assignment of a contract to provide transportation services for elderly and
handicapped persons is made clear by the following language:
[A] "personal services" contract [is] one in which the offeree is vested with
discretion in accomplishing the assigned tasks... and could not be duplicated by others .... As the ability to define the task... expand[s], discretion
to add input and knowledge to the outcome lessens. Thus, where specific
guidelines exist, the need fora personal service diminishes [and assignment
should be allowed] 2 "

26 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325G.31 (West 1981)

(plain language
required); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1967 (1993) (lemon law).
20 See e.g., Magnuson-Moss Waranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301-12 (1988) (Federal provisions for warranties provided
in sale of consumer goods); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 777 (McKinney & Supp. 1994) (new home warranty law).
2
Examples include: professional licensing (attorneys, architects, professional engineers) and nonprofessional
services (surveyors, contractors, real estate brokers, mortgage brokers, insurance agents).
a" Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prods. Co., Inc., 801 F.2d 1001, 1010 (8th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting).
Id. Judge Posner gives a few examples of this phenomena: "Steel companies both make fabricated steel and sell
raw steelto competingfabricators.General Motors sells cars manufactured by a competitor,Isuzu." Id. (emphasis

added).
-" 595 N.E.2d 508 (Ohio CL App. 1991).
Id.

27

2

Id. at 511.
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The courts can make a factual determination that a contract is so vague as to the
task to be performed and so imbued with discretion, to make it unassignable. A court
has already allowed for a partial delegation of a personal service contract where the
obligor retained certain supervisory controls over the assigneeYm Thus, discretion and
supervision are factors to be weighed when making an assignment determination."
The author believes, the time is at hand to eliminate per se nonassignability. Furthermore, it is this author's belief that it is justifiable to swing the pendulum in favor of
the obligor in all assignments. The person challenging an assignment should be required
to overcome a presumption of assignability.
V. PRESUMPTION OF ASSIGNABILITY
It is offered that strong practical reasons argue in favor of overturning theper se rule
of nonassignability and replacing it with a presumption of assignability. This is supported by the following: (1)The case law has shown that the decisional matrix surrounding the per se rule is hopelessly confused.r 2 (2) Alternative approaches can be utilized
to make more rational and direct determinations on assignability.2 3 (3) Public policy
considerations strongly favor assignability of many of the contracts which have come
under the purview of the per se rule. (4) Precedent currently exists within the law of
assignments for such an approach.
A. Public Policy Considerations
1. The Nature of Transactions
The world has changed since the adoption of theperserule of nonassignability. In
the past almost all contracts were of a personal nature. They involved mostly one-onone dealings for the sale of goods and services. The nature of relational contracts 4 has

The importance of discretion and supervision can be found elsewhere in the law. For example, tax courts look
to such factors in making a determination as to whether someone is an "employee" or an "independent contractor."
Everhart v. United States, 71-1 T. C.M. (CCH) 9368, 9368 (W.D.N.C. 1971) ("The fundamental question is whether
the person who makes an agreement with another has or retains the right to control the details or the way the job is
done...21 Arnold Prods., Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 298 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1962). Contra Bd. of Comm'rs v. Diebold Safe
& Lock Co., 133 U.S. 473 (1890).
zn See Madison v. Moon, 306 P.2d 15, 20-21 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1957
71 Supra Sections I and Ill.
7" Supra Section IV.
Z' One commentatornoted the modem phenomena of "relationizing in transactions." Macneil, supranote 58,at763.
As he puts it: "Why are relations increasingly the dominant form of economic activity... in modem society?...
[Wihy are transactions increasingly taking place in relational frameworks?" Id.
2
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changed dramatically over the last fifty to one hundred years?275 In the age of large
corporations, mega-sized law firms, the large size of the financial stakes,276 and the length
and sophistication of today's contracts,2 " the per se rule is out of touch with the reality
of the times.
At the same time relational contracts have expanded in scope, they have also in some
areas become more fungible or standardized.? Thus, many transactions considered
strictly personal in the past have become more transactional in nature and more akin to
a sale of goods.279 "The mere fact, however, that a contract calls for... service [should]
not [be] sufficient to render it nonassignable. . ...
=
2. Conformity To General Rule of Assignability
The fact that the per se rule is an exception, should allow one to utilize the public
policy matrix espoused in support of general assignability. The major premise at the
foundation of assignability has been stated as the preservation of"the sanctity of contract
and providing uniformity and certainty in commercial transactions. '2 1 This article has
shown that the application of the per se rule has failed to provide any such uniformity
or certainty. A presumption of assignability is warranted for all contracts and would be
consistent with the fundamental policy that "free alienability... is essential to coin2
merce.',
Because of the failure of the per se rule, 3 an entirely new approach is needed. In
commenting upon the differences between transactional and relational contracts, Professor Macneil argues for the "development of [a new] overall structure of contract law for
both relations and transactions. ' "
" See Peter J. Bishop, The Modern Employment Contract, 12 ADvOC. Q. 245, (1989) ("In our view, 18th and 19th
century principles of contract law... are not sufficient to deal with the modem employment relationship.").
""[Bly far the greatest number of scholars and commentators explored the relationship of contract law to economics." E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in ContractLawDuringthe 1980s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L REV.
203,227 (1990).
' "The complexity of most agreements insures that such agreements will rarely be fully completed." See Egan,
supranote 7 at 312.
'- Supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
n, For example, this author would argue that the standards relating to title abstracts and title insurance have become
so standardized that contracts to provide them should be assignable to any other reputable title company. But see Linn
County Abstract Co. v Beechley, 99 N.W. 702 (Iowa 1904).
' In re Compass Van & Storage Corp., 65 B.R. 1007, 1011(1986). See also Schultz v. Ingram, 248 S.E.2d 345,350
(1978) ("Nevertheless, personal service contracts may be assigned ...").
2
Pino v. Spanish Broadcasting System of Florida, 564 So.2d 186, 189 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1990).
m CALAMARI & PERiU-o,supra note 148, at 633. In reference to the history of the law of assignments the authors
state that it has been a "struggle between commercial needs and the tenacity of legal conceptualism." Id. at 724.
' "The modem history of ...assignments is one of piecemeal reform by statute or decision. The legal pattern of
any particular moment was usually a disgrace." Braucher, supra note 148, at 608.
z' Macneil, supranote 62, at 608.
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The author believes that in the area of assignability, a presumption of assignability
would be easy to rebut for those duties which should remain nondelegable by application
of the approaches discussed earlier in this article.w Thus, a contract for the services of
Luciano Pavarotti would still be nonassignable as a uniquely relational duty.'
3. The "New Spirit" of Assignment
The author's support for freer assignability by way of a presumption is consistent
to what is often referred to as the "new spirit of contract". Simply put, "every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing.' ' 8 The use of a presumption of assignability would be a way of requiring that the obligee gives a "good faith"
reason for not consenting to an assignment. 2 9
Since, many relational contracts are long-term this duty of good faith is especially
important. A "duty to bargain should be imposed when unanticipated changes occur
during the performance of a long-term contract.' " 90 An assignment by an obligee could
be considered such an "unanticipated change." Instead of allowing one party the absolute right to treat the assignment as a breach,2 1 the parties should attempt to negotiate
in order to salvage the essence of the contract. For example, the obligee should be
allowed to negotiate reasonable assurances of performance in exchange for her consent
to the assignment. I believe that a presumption of assignability would help compel such
good faith bargaining.
Another factor to be weighed is the continuing liability of the assignor. If it is clear
that the assignor is to remain liable, then the obligee would be on weaker ground if she
refuses to give consent to the assignment. If it is clear that the obligor will not or can not
personally give performance, then all the parties can only benefit from the assignment 29
In short, why foreclose all chances for performance? The obligee is protected by the
general rule of assignability that"a duty can never be escaped by... delegation; but any
duty can be extinguished by performance.' 293 If the substituted performance does not
Supra Section IV.
z" Macneil would explain this type of contract as one involving a "primary relation" where the "participantsinteract
Macneil, supra note
as unique and total individuals. Uniqueness means that response is to a particularperson ....
63, at 722 (citing SOCIOLOGY 120-21 (4th ed. 1968)).
' Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit ofContract,2 J.L & COM. 193,193 (1982).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
2 It would prevent the "bad faith... 'abuse' [ofl the powertoterminate a contract." Macneil,supra note 63 at 722.
no Id.
I This current right under the per se rle is inconsistent with an aggrieved party's duty to mitigate which is found
elsewhere in the law of contracts.
= It should be remembered this will allow the interests of innocent third party assignees to be entered into the
equation of assignment. A presumption of assignability would be protective of those rights.
I Corbin, supra note 1. at 217.
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satisfy the basis of the bargain, then the obligee would still be able to sue the assignor-

obligor for damages for breach of contract.29
A major side benefit to the presumption of assignability approach is that it may
increase the awareness of the parties at the time of contracting to the issue of assignment.
It is presumed that most parties to today's contracts, with the aid of legal counsel, are
capable of protecting their own rights and interests. They should be encouraged to
negotiate express nonassignability clauses into their contracts. These express
nonassignment clauses should be as specific as possible.29 They should unbundle all the
rights and duties within the contract and state which ones are assignable. For example,
can the right to collect monies under the contract be assigned? What is the importance

of a party's specific credit to the other party to the contract? 296 What effect will a change
in the legal form of one of the parties have on the contract? 297 Finally, does the change
in "key" personnel within the business organization of one of the parties violate the
nonassignability clause? 298 If a presumption of assignability makes parties more aware
of the assignment issue, then it will have served its purpose.
B. The Landlord-TenantModel of Assignment
The approach suggested in this article is not without precedent in the law of assignments. An analogy can be found in the "consent shall not be unreasonably withheld"
principle found in the area of assignments involving real estate leases. In essence, leases
are prestwnedto be assignable unless the landlord can give a good faith or commercially
reasonable reason for withholding consent. This rule has been applied even in cases

2" This approach, in contrast to the perse rule, would fulfill "the court's duty to sustain the legality of a contracL"
17AAM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 264 (1991). Furthermore, it may help prevent unnecessarylawsuits in the assignments
allow for completion of contract performance without court interference.
20 An example of an express nonassignability clause is one commonly found in mortgage brokerage agreements:
"Broker may not assign or transfer its duties or rights under this Agreement without prior written consent of ABC
Mortgage Company. A change in the ownership, merger or consolidation of Broker shall be considered as assignment
for purposes of this Agreement." Wholesale Agreement, American Residential Mortgage Corporation (on file with
the Akron Law Reveiw).
2" The clause may provide that consent "shall not be unreasonably withheld." If so it should spell out what types
of assurances would be considered sufficient to allow an assignmenL See infra Section V.B.
297 The clause should be specific as to what types of changes in legal form will work an assignment and require the
consent of the other party. See supranote 295.
2" The parties would be even more prudent if they provided for arbitration in case of dispute over the meanings of
the provisions in the nonassignment clause. See, e.g., Gerald Aksen, Legal Considerationsin Using Arbitration
Clausesto Resolve FutureProblems Which May Arise During Long-Term BusinessAgreements, 28 BUS. LAW. 595

(1973).
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where the lease specifically precludes assignment.2' An increasing number of states,
either by judicial decision t ' or by statute,30' have enacted this principle into law. n
At one time leases of property were considered personal in nature and per se
nonassignable by the lessee.w3 Over time, the courts have recognized the changing
nature of such contracts. "Relationships between lessor and lessee have tended to
become more and more impersonal."' 04
The court in Fernandezv. Vazquez3 listed a number of reasons for the evolution of
the "consent not to be unreasonably withheld" principle: First, "[tlhe law generally
favors free alienation."
Second, the increased prominence of the "general contract
principles of good faith and commercial reasonableness."' Third, the law is capable
of developing "factors" which canbe considered "in applying the standards ofgood faith
and commercial reasonableness."3 For example, the financial stability of the proposed
assignee, the nature of the business and its effect upon the existing tenant mix, the legality
of the proposed use, are all considered legitimate reasons for withholding consent.31
"Denying consent solely on the basis of personal taste, convenience or sensibility""31
would be considered unreasonable. It is this type of approach that should be expanded
and applied to the area of assignments to be vacated by the elimination of theperserule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether we label this approach objective or subjective is not material. The time is
right to install more uniformity and predictability into the law of assignments. The times
and the nature of transactions have changed since the days of Lunley v. Wagner.3 '
See Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So.2d 1171 (Fla. Dist. C. App. 1981).

Id.; Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985).
' ALASKA STAT. § 34.030.060 (1975); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5512(b) (1974); HAW. REV. STAT. § 516-63
(1985); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney 1982).

The law at one time almost universally allowed a landlord to arbitrarily refuse to accept an assignee. Fernandez,

397 So.2d at 1171.
Kendall, 709 P2d at 843-44. The Kendall case is a good example of how the old rule of nonassignability was
subject to abuse. In that case the assignee was a more qualified tenant than the original lessee. Id. at 839-40. It
possessed a stronger financial statement, had greater net worth, and was willing to be bound by the terms of the lease.

Id. Nonetheless, the lessor withheld its consent in order to obtain increased rent." Id. at 840.
3O' Id. at 844. See also Murray S.
,vin,
Withholding Consent toAssignment: The Changing Rights ofthe Commercial Landlord, 30 DEPAUL L REv. 109 (1980).

397 Sold 1171 (Fla. Dist. C. App. 1981).
3w Id. at 1172.

Id.at 1174.
3Id.

" Id. The court lists a total of five factors to be considered. Id.
310 Id.

3111 De G., M. & G. 604,619,622 (Ch. App. 1852).
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443

The economics, relative bargaining powers, and public policy concems of the 1990's
support the elimination of the per se rule of nonassignability that is attached to personal
service contracts. Instead, a completely different approach is needed. A presumption
of assignability should be seriously considered to replace the per se nle.
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